The Club for Growth is running a PAC attack (not using its 527 subsidiary) on Howard Dean in Des Moines. In the ad, a couple leaving a barber shop tell the camera that "Howard Dean should take his tax-hiking, government-expanding, latte-drinking, sushi-eating, Volvo-driving, New York Times-reading, body piercing, Hollywood-loving, left-wing freak show back to Vermont where it belongs."

Harry and Louise they ain't.

I'm not sure what CfG expects to get out of this campaign. Not only is it targeted to Democrats who could be expected to be somewhat unreceptive to such a message, the shrill tone and Beltway-centric beef-and-corn view of Iowa kills what could otherwise be a valid criticism of Dean. (For the record, you can get pretty good lattes at the local mall, buy the Times in any Starbucks or Barnes and Noble's, and get a body piercing at any of five locations down near the university. To be fair, sushi's a bit hard to come by, being rather far from the coasts, and you have to go to Sioux City to buy that Volvo.) It might energize some folks out in the west of the state, but only the ones unlikely to show up at the Democratic caucus, or do a persuasive job once they're there.

What really hurts the CfG ad, to my mind, is that the people it depicts are precisely the sort of couple you don't want to be trapped next to at breakfast. ("You can take your runny-egg, burned-bacon, cold-potato, weak-coffee breakfast right back to the kitchen where it belongs! And don't expect a tip, neither!")

 
Two stories today on political insiders: Kerry operative Michael Whouley at TNR and Clark oppo demon Chris Lehane in the NYT.

As Kerry has floundered, I've wondered repeatedly -- and loudly -- what happened to the legendary magic of Whouley, a Massachusetts fixer who worked with Clinton (both in the campaigns and as a political operative within the White House) and, in 2000, stage-managed Gore's comeback against Bradley in the Iowa and New Hampshire primaries. But Whouley seems to be working his mojo again, with Kerry rising unexpectedly in the polls after a long period in which he lost the "man to beat" status to an upstart governor from Vermont. If he helps Kerry pull off a "comeback kid" upset, he'll go down in the annals of political history.

Lehane was with Kerry, but left to join up with Clark when the Kerry campaign was wracked by internal turmoil. Lehane's an attack dog -- he plays smashmouth politics as well as anyone, but that's all he plays, and if he's let off the leash at the correct times, he can be a valuable asset. The attacks on Dean showing up in Iowa are classic Lehane: for example, the surfacing of Dean's 2000 attacks on the Iowa caucus system obviously caught the other candidates by surprise (none had any comments available in time for the Des Moines newscast), suggesting that it was an out-of-state hit job. (It's no surprise that Dean's campaign has accused Lehane of digging up the footage.)

Lest the goo-goos start in again about the need to "change the tone" of campaigning, the only difference between Lehane and other oppo specialists is his desire for personal publicity, which tends to work against him. Campaigns need to play smashmouth, period. It's only when oppo work gets into gossip-mongering insinuations -- see the recent "Dean's Trooper" story, which prompted the ABC Political Unit to quickly distance itself from the Investigation Unit -- that the Republic might get into trouble. (But, really, is this any worse than "Ma, ma, where's my pa?" We survived Grover Cleveland just fine.)

 
As widely reported, Carol Moseley-Braun today dropped out of the Democratic race, asking her supporters to line up behind Dean. Since Moseley-Braun dropped out before any of the binding primaries, she has no pledged delegates she can release for Dean.

It is assumed by most political analysts that Moseley-Braun ran primarily to repair an image tattered by scandal. If so, she succeeded admirably, casting herself as an articulate promoter of left-liberal ideas and using the publicity opportunities of her run to place herself in the public mind. (When it came to showing moderation on the matter of postwar Iraq, it didn't hurt that Congressman Karma was in the race. Next to Kucinich, George McGovern would look like a Scoop Jackson Democrat.)

Ambassador Moseley-Braun's candidacy did provide one bit of levity: the chance to watch as NOW, relentlessly pursuing its goal of total irrelevancy, endorsed her for President.

And now there are eight.

 
Joe Lieberman has evidently cut his entire oppo team for budgetary reasons, since he goes to the Drudge Report for dirt on Gen. Clark's testimony in the run-up to the Iraq invasion:

MANCHESTER, NH -- Joe Lieberman issued the following statement in response to the Drudge Report's discovery of congressional testimony from September 2002 in which Wes Clark made the case for war in Iraq. The report provides evidence directly contradicting Clark's repeated claims that he has been "very consistent" on the war "from the very beginning."

Statement by Joe Lieberman

"Yesterday, Wesley Clark attacked me for pointing out his multiple positions on the war in Iraq. It is no longer credible for Wesley Clark to assert that he has always had only one position on the war - being against it. His own testimony before Congress shows otherwise.

"He may think it is 'old-style politics' to point this out, but the only thing old here is a candidate not leveling with the American people. If we want to begin anew and replace George Bush, we need to level with the American people, which is what I have done in this campaign and throughout my career. You may not always agree with me but you will always know where I stand."

Unfortunately for Lieberman, he's currently standing in a rather embarassing place: the Drudge "exclusive" was exclusively wrong in mischaracterizing Clark's testimony, as Knight-Ridder points out. Right or wrong, insightful or inane, Clark's position on the Iraq invasion has remained consistent. (The Lieberman press release seems to have been dropped down Joe's memory hole -- but Drudge, and Josh Marshall, both remember.)

There were four main points to Clark's testimony, none of which were brought out in Drudge's story. In particular, Clark sought to distinguish between al'Qaeda and Saddamist Iraq; came out in favor of producing a credible threat of force against Iraq as a way of legitimizing diplomatic efforts to contain Iraq; argued that an invasion of Iraq was likely necessary at some point in the future, but the distance of the threat made necessary diplomatic dialogue and the inclusion of a broad-based, NATO-centric coalition; and warned that the aftermath of an invasion of Iraq was likely to be the kind of chaotic nation-building situation that the military expressly does not wish to be embroiled in.

To summarize Clark's position: Saddam is a threat, but he is not related to the Islamist terrorists we are currently at war with, and there is no evidence that he has an unconventional weapons stock that poses an immediate or near-term danger. Eventually, he will pose a threat to the region, but aggressive sanctions and inspections can continue to delay that day. Although we will one day have to deal with him through forceful means, we have enough time to bring the world along with us through diplomacy in the form of a broad, NATO-based military coalition and an international, U.N.-led postwar alliance that will allow us to remove our military without having them become embroiled in what could be a chaotic occupation.

The following are selections from Clark's testimony, by subject:

IRAQ AND AL'QAEDA AS INDIVIDUAL THREATS

[A]s far as the intelligence is concerned and the time available, I don't know how to make sense of the intelligence. I mean we've heard six months from the CIA. We've heard the latest British estimate of a couple of years. We've heard other people say a year. We've heard Iraqi defectors saying it's ready. All he has to do is just machine the plutonium if he can get his hands on it.

The honest truth is that the absence of intelligence is not an adequate reason to go forward to war in and of itself.

[T]here hasn't been any substantiation of the linkage of the Iraqi regime to the events of 9/11 or the fact that they are giving weapons of mass destruction capability to Al Qaida.

[T]he problem of Iraq is only one element of the broader security challenges facing our country. We have an unfinished worldwide war against Al Qaida, a war that has to be won in conjunction with friends and allies and that ultimately will be won as much by persuasion as by the use of force. We've got to turn off the Al Qaida recruiting machine. Now some 3,000 deaths on September 11th testify to the real danger from Al Qaida, and I think everyone acknowledges that Al Qaida has not yet been defeated.

As far as I know, I haven't seen any substantial evidence linking Saddam's regime to the Al Qaida network, though such evidence may emerge. But nevertheless, winning the war against Al Qaida and taking actions against the weapons programs in Iraq, that's two different problems that may require two different sets of solutions. In other words, to put it back into military parlance, Iraq they're an operational level problem. We've got other operational level problems in the Middle East, like the ongoing conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Al Qaida and the foundation of radical extremist fundamentalist Islam, that's the strategic problem.

We've got to make sure that in addressing the operational problem we're effective in going after the larger strategic problem. And so, the critical issue facing the United States right now is how to force action against Saddam Hussein and his weapons programs without detracting from our focus on Al Qaida or our efforts to deal with other immediate mid and long-term security problems.

THE CREDIBLE THREAT OF FORCE AS DIPLOMATIC TOOL

I think it's not time yet to use force against Iraq but it is certainly time to put that card on the table, to turn it face up and to wave it and the president is doing that and I think that the United States Congress has to indicate after due consideration and consulting our people and building our resolve that yes, this is a significant security problem for the United States of America and all options are on the table including the use of force as necessary to solve this problem because I think that's what's required to leverage any hope of solving this problem short of war.

Well, as I said, I don't think you can achieve a diplomatic resolution to this without the ultimate -- without putting force on the table as the last resort and it's got to be really on the table, and I think you know I feel very comfortable. I think I have proved to this body that I'm willing to use -- personally that I've been able when the time comes to pull the trigger, to pull the trigger. So you don't put that option on the table unless you really mean it.

I do believe that the United States diplomacy in the United Nations will be strengthened if the Congress can adopt a resolution expressing U.S. determination to act if the United Nations can not act. The use of force must remain a U.S. option under active consideration.

Such congressional resolution need not, at this point, authorize the use of force. The more focused the resolution on Iraq, the more focused it is on the problems of weapons of mass destruction. The greater its utility in the United Nations, the more nearly unanimous the resolution, the greater its utility is, the greater its impact is on the diplomatic efforts under way.

[T]he option to use force must remain on the table. It should be used as the last resort after all diplomatic means have been exhausted unless there's information that indicates that a further delay would represent an immediate risk to the assembled forces and organizations. And, I want to underscore that I think the United States should not categorize this action as preemptive. Preemptive and that doctrine has nothing whatsoever to do with this problem.

THE NECESSITY OF DIPLOMACY

[T]he administration has not proceeded heretofore in a way that would encourage its friends and allies to support it. One of the problems we have is the overhang from a number of decisions taken by the administration which have undercut its friends and allies around the world and given the impression that the United States doesn't respect the opinions of other.

The president and his national security team have got to deploy imagination, leverage, and patience in working through the United Nations. In the near term, time is on our side and we should endeavor to use the United Nations if at all possible. This may require a period of time for inspections or the development of a more intrusive inspection regime. ...

We have to build up the leverage that our diplomats need. We have one of the greatest secretaries of state we've ever had, General Colin Powell up there. We've got to give him the backing he needs, the leverage he needs and the president's got to have what he needs to make it very clear what the consequences for the United Nations and our allies are if we don't move ahead, and then we got to roll up our sleeves and we got to do the dirty work and it's difficult work. It's hard work. It's work that lots of people find very cumbersome. We've got to deal with our allies. We've got to persuade them.

THE DANGER OF THE AFTERMATH

[O]nce we move into [Iraq], what we can expect is a complete breakdown of governmental authority. ... [W]e really don't know what we're going to face. So in the immediate aftermath, there's going to be the possibility of a chaotic environment that's going to require a substantial American presence as well as a vast humanitarian governmental structure to meet the needs of the 23 million Iraqi people.

We need to be ready because if suddenly Saddam Hussein's government collapses and we don't have everything ready to go, we're going to have chaos in that region. We may not get control of all the weapons of mass destruction, technicians, plans, capabilities; in fact, what may happen is that we'll remove a repressive regime and have it replaced with a fundamentalist regime which contributes to the strategic problem rather than helping to solve it.

[I]f you're going to have an exit strategy, you're going to have a turnover you have to anticipate some of the worst things that might happen. You hope they won't happen and they may not. It may be just as Richard Perle has suggested maybe a lay down. This thing may turn out -- they do have an educated population. They're one of the most western-oriented countries in the region. There's also been a lot of psychological trauma inflicted on them so you don't know but you have to prepare
for the worst.

I hope that we're starting to do that in a very, very serious way but there are a number of steps that have to be taken first, like engaging international organizations and the U.N. and trying to build a framework because we don't want to put the United States armed forces if it takes I don't know how many, 50,000, 70,000 initially.

We don't want a bunch of young men in battle dress uniforms out there indefinitely trying to perform humanitarian assistance. That's not our job. We're not very good at it. We're also not any good at police work. Now we're doing a lot of it in place like Kosovo and Bosnia and we have and it's been unfortunate. So we should try to do better in this case.