Moving the goalposts: President Bush declares that Hizb Allah "suffered a defeat," says "There's going to be a new power in the south of Lebanon."

In the New Yorker, Hersh provides more information on the Israeli actions. One passage is of particular note:

The surprising strength of Hezbollah’s resistance, and its continuing ability to fire rockets into northern Israel in the face of the constant Israeli bombing, the Middle East expert told me, "is a massive setback for those in the White House who want to use force in Iran. And those who argue that the bombing will create internal dissent and revolt in Iran are also set back."

Nonetheless, some officers serving with the Joint Chiefs of Staff remain deeply concerned that the Administration will have a far more positive assessment of the air campaign than they should, the former senior intelligence official said. "There is no way that Rumsfeld and Cheney will draw the right conclusion about this," he said. "When the smoke clears, they’ll say it was a success, and they’ll draw reinforcement for their plan to attack Iran."

Make no mistake: Hizb Allah has shown itself to be a very capable paranational military force, even though Syria cut off its supply routes relatively early in the war. Israel's strategy, on the other hand, was monumentally unsuccessful, showing the relative inutility of large-scale air assaults in 4GW. Only a repeat of the 1982 invasion could have successfully routed Hizb Allah, and Israel was unwilling to repeat its eighteen-year-long experience in occupation.

The cease-fire, while certainly welcome for civilians on both sides of the border, will almost certainly not lead to an excision of Hizb Allah's paramility capability; Nasr Allah's prestige has expanded exponentially in not only Lebanon (which was tired of him and his thugs before the Israeli attacks) but in the wider Arab world; and Iran had an opportunity to see some of its weapons and 4GW tactics tested against a modern conventional military force, to satisfying effect.

In the long run, Hizb Allah will be back, especially since Israel's attacks significantly damaged the already fragile stability of Lebanon's government and the incursion created new moral flashpoints for the Arab "street." (The extent of damage in Qana II is debatable; its long-term effect on Arab minds is not.) Nothing has been done to cut Hizb Allah from Iran, and thus Syria will remain (largely unwillingly) in the Iranian orbit. Hence, the strategic situation has deteriorated from a month ago: there remains the probability of the creation of a geopolitical continuum of interest stretching from Tehran through Baghdad and Damascus to Israel's front door, and Israel has lost some of its hard-won military prestige, shown in Arab governments' quick turnaround from their initial condemnation of Hizb Allah.

But, hell, let's declare victory and get out. More background on the Israeli incursion at Global Guerillas.